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Introduction 
 
Si vis pacem stude bellum. Indeed defense economists are more focused on the 
preparation for war or its (possible) economic consequences and the efficiency of resource use 
by the military-industrial-political complex than truly analyzing the economic grounds for 
peace. Even though working on military spending and related economic phenomenon, many 
economists have been looking for the means to reduce the social costs of such spending and 
avoid the militarization of the world that results in conflicts and wars. 
 
 Nevertheless, peace remains in the background. Isard and Anderton (1992), among 
many papers, give good illustrations of this trend. Even though they propose "a survey of the 
peace economics literature," their article is dedicated to arms races, arms control, resource 
allocation problems related to military spending, the economic and social impacts of military 
expenditures, but peace is not analyzed as a positive issue. 
 
 The ‘dark side’ of defense has absorbed almost all of the energy of defense economists. 
This bias seems to echo the motto of decision-makers: si vis pacem para bellum, and it is fully 
understandable given the incredible level of defense spending since 1945 and even more since 
2001. Economists cannot remain passive when such a large share of national income goes to 
defense while unsatisfied social needs in the form of poverty, lack of housing, inadequate 
education and poor health are so large. 
 
 However defining the economic conditions of peace should receive similar interest, or 
at least be a full issue per se. Indeed, an alternative to criticizing military spending is to define 
how to reduce  military spending and how to create a peaceful world. It would, however, be 
unfair to say that economists have left such research to other academic disciplines. Many 
economists are truly concerned by peace and the need for harmony among economic agents. 
However, relatively few academic economists allocate their time and research resources to 
studying the economics of war and peace. This article describes the development of economic 
thought on peace as the starting point for further research dedicated to the economic analysis 
of peace. 
 
 The article is organized as follows: Section 1 explains how peace is considered as the 
result of economic progress and the generalization of market mechanisms, with a special focus 
on Thorstein Veblen. Here, the history of economic thought makes a valuable contribution to 
our understanding of the development of knowledge in this field.  Section 2 analyzes the 
                                                 
1 Article paru en 2008 dans la revue Defence and Peace Economics 
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economic consequences of militarism, based on vested interests and undermining (potential) 
economic growth. Section 3 presents economists' proposals in favor of international peace, 
summarizing on-going debates since the Second World War. We then conclude with a research 
agenda for true peace economics. 
 
1. Economists heralding peace: from liberalism to institutionalism 
 
 Since conflicts disorganize production and trade, it is not surprising that liberal 
economists have always opposed militarism and economic development. The British Classical 
economists condemned protectionism and militarism; and most of them shared the conviction 
that economic progress would lead to a lasting international peace. The triumph of economic 
science in the nineteenth century  reinforced the optimism of certain economists concerning the 
realization of world peace, in particular, due to the education of the population, which would 
be bound to become aware of the superiority of economic laws and consequently of free trade. 
But there were  few economists really focusing on military issues. Veblen was  one of them, as 
he developed an explanatory theory of militarism in a capitalist system, concluding that a 
probable reduction in international conflicts would result from economic development. 
 
International peace as a key achievement of economic and scientific progress: a 
nineteenth century liberal view 
 
International peace through economic progress 
  
 Starting at the end of the eighteenth century, the liberal school of economics identifies 
the achievement of world peace as a possible consequence of the expansion of international 
trade. A dominant school since the birth of economics, liberalism is based on the postulate 
according to which the general interest lies above all in the increase of national wealth. It places 
economic prosperity at the foreground of political concerns, in contrast to the realist approach. 
 
 Admittedly, Smith (1776) explicitly wrote that “defense (…) is much more important 
than opulence.” However, he proposed the renunciation of colonies as well as aggressive trade 
measures to ensure the development of a mutually advantageous international trade. Ricardo’s 
famous theory of comparative advantages states that the division of labor between individuals, 
regions and nations leads to the best situation with regard to the general interest. However, the 
specialization of national economies can only be allowed through the development of trade 
without the interference of tariffs or subsidies. The British classical economists considered that 
mercantilism and colonialism hindered the general interest, notably because they lead to a high 
level of military expenditures to ensure the defense of the empire and trigger conflicts. This 
classical theory is therefore at the root of pacifism in economics. One can find its roots in the 
French Physiocrats, led by F. Quesnay. One of his disciples, Mirabeau (1760), describes 
humanity as one big family.  
 
 The liberal school later developed the idea that the growth of industry and trade favours 
a state of mind opposed to warmongering. Thus, John Stuart Mill (1848) considered that wars 
and commercial conquests are characteristic of a still-young humanity. He argued that trade 
has civilizing and peacemaking virtues, since it creates links with foreigners and leads the 
populace to consider foreign wealth without envy. International trade strengthens and 
reinforces individual interests that are naturally opposed to war. Mill felt that this is the main 
guarantee of world peace, advancing ideas, institutions and, more globally, the morality of 
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human-kind. Mill considered moral progress as more important than economic progress, since 
it is the final aim of humanity. 
 
 The idea of war becoming gradually archaic as a result of economic development also 
appeared in other theoretical schools. Marx (1852, 1853) recognized that the development of 
capitalism results in the replacement of military conflicts by economic war, because peace 
serves the interests of the bourgeoisie. However, he opposed the pacifist doctrines of “the 
Manchester school”: the call to peace of the bourgeoisie hides that its struggle for hegemony 
remains, even though soldiers are replaced by commercial measures. Marx emphasized that if 
the Manchester school wants peace, it is only because it expects to focus all resources on 
industrial war.2 
 
 Liberal analysis linking the development of market mechanisms and the pacification of 
international relations is still strong. Recently, Fukuyama (1993) developed such an idea 
through his theory of “the end of history.” Observing the political changes of the late 1980s 
and the diffusion of democracy and liberalism, he considered that wars would become less and 
less probable. 
 
International peace by the spreading of economic knowledge 
  
 The 19th century was marked by industrialization and the triumph of science, the latter 
being presented as able to solve all problems. Comte's positivism was based on the belief that 
the entire universe is governed by scientific laws that could be deduced from empirical 
observation, a view that follows from the philosophy of natural law born in the 18th century 
Enlightenment. Positivism has had a strong influence on economics, with some liberal 
economists aiming to finding universal laws governing the social universe, just as Newton 
discovered the natural laws of the physical universe. Thus, Say (1828) considered that the 
history of economic thought is characterized by the progressive correction of erroneous ideas, 
until the discovery of true laws governing the economy, which will allow it to reach a state of 
permanent world peace. His “Law of Market” is, therefore, fundamental since it demonstrates 
the superiority of the market system, free from state interventionism. Here, economists played 
a key social role to promote peace by informing public opinion of its true interests, thereby 
eroding popular support for military adventures initiated by governments. Nevertheless, one 
condition for the spreading of a peaceful state of mind through the population is that the 
political system be sufficiently representative to reflect the ‘popular will.’ Marginalists shared 
the same conception of the role played by economic knowledge and aimed at building an 
economic science on the model of natural sciences, following a hypothetico-deductive 
methodology. Thus, Walras (1907) sought to find the scientific laws governing the economy. 
He considered that the economist had first to work on pure political economy, then social 
political economy and eventually applied political economy. Denouncing the “rantings” of 
protectionists or colonialists, Walras wanted to propose new ideal and new dogmas, which 
should represent an alternative to the opposition between individualism and communism or 
between liberalism and socialism. Thus, he stated that the search for universal peace underlies 
his entire scientific project, with world peace as the ultimate achievement of economic science. 
  
                                                 
 
  2 Marx and Engels emphasize that true peace can only be reached when the socialist mode of production will 
replace capitalism, since this is the sine qua non condition to suppress antagonisms on which all kinds of conflicts 
grow. 
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 The idea that public opinion needs to be educated in favor of peace had many other 
defenders in the 19th century. One can quote Passy, a key figure of the French peace movement 
and founder of the International League for Peace in 1867 as well as the Society for the 
Arbitration between Nations in 1870. In his writings, Passy particularly insists on the need for 
spreading “peaceful education,” in a perpetual action to gain, step-by-step, public opinion 
worldwide with the idea of the need for peace. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1901, at 
the same time as Dunant. 
 
Pacifism as a spin-off of the capitalist system: Veblen and the institutionalist school 
 
 Neoclassical economists in the 19th century wanted to impose their discipline as a 
science, which led them to ban political issues from their field of analysis. Neoclassical 
modeling describes a simplified economic reality, with no exogenous shocks. Consequently, 
there were very few economic studies focusing on defense issues. A notable exception can be 
found in the institutionalist school. Above all, Thorstein Veblen was the first economist to 
devote a whole book to the question of peace: An inquiry into the nature of peace and the terms 
of its perpetuation (1917). Peace and militarism issues were already largely tackled in Veblen's 
previous book, Imperial Germany and the industrial revolution (1915). 
 
 Veblen developed an evolutionary theory of the warlike dynastic state moving towards 
the more peaceful modern state with a possible return to the dynastic state. Contrary to Marx, 
Veblen did not have a deterministic approach. Whereas he mentioned the possible exacerbation 
of militarism in industrial countries, he considered that progress in world peace could be 
sustainable. 
 
 Veblen explained that institutions affect states of mind, thus determining social 
evolutions. Conversely, changes in perception linked to the spreading of new ideas would 
induce institutional and social changes. Veblen presented human relations as being affected by 
both force and the predatory instinct. War has played a central part in the evolution of societies, 
operating in a process of selection among institutions. This is an essential element of social 
change, just as the various economic measures established in the name of national security. 
War and trade have always been in interaction: therefore the expansion of trade does not 
guarantee international peace per se. 
 
 Veblen, however, stated that societies tend to become increasingly peaceful. He 
proposed two “types” of society, the dynastic and the modern one. In each society there would 
remain a competition between commercial and dynastic interests. In Anglo-Saxon countries 
(in particular the US and the UK), the dynastic society was replaced by the modern one, but in 
other countries, the dynastic type was dominant. Veblen took Germany as an example of a 
dynastic state, characterized by a delayed process of economic and political modernization and 
the inheritance from feudal times of a specifically warlike state of mind, maintained by the 
practice of war. The difficulty experienced by Germany to impose itself as an independent 
nation also explains the survival of the dominant characteristics of the feudal state in that 
country. On the other hand, England went through a period of relative peace since the 18th 
century, which enabled her to promote the “arts of peace” rather than those of war. 
 
 In a modern society, Veblen believed peace is the normal situation; autocracy would 
be replaced by a representative government and individual initiative would be respected. 
Material concerns are predominant and military expenditures tend to be reduced to a minimum 
level sufficient to ensure defense. An additional factor driving modern societies towards 
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pacifism is the increasing sophistication of military technologies, which makes war more and 
more destructive and impersonal, as well as less able to favor social cohesion. Other 
expenditures increase, in particular ostentatious or sport-related expenditures. Sport expenses 
were, just as military expenditure, believed to be a necessary waste, which diverted the energy 
and attention of the population and maintained a relative equality in the standards of living, 
which was favorable to the cohesion of the population. 
  
 Veblen was a critic of capitalism, considering that it evolves towards a crisis because 
of its institutional stalemates. Due to its social importance the capitalist class monopolizes 
technological or productivity profits generated by the whole society. This domination of the 
“absentee owners” disturbs both consumption and production and thus weakens initiatives and 
industrial innovations. If workers do not revolt against this system, it is notably because of 
their identification with the nation: nationalism and patriotism are states of mind inherited from 
feudal times, which favour wars. Governments in modern societies are consequently induced 
to maintain a certain level of militarism to reinforce the system. Thus, military and commercial 
conflicts still concern so-called “modern” states. The danger, however, is that such a policy 
may strengthen “dynastic instincts” hidden inside the social institutions. This can be only 
temporary, in the case of a war for example; but it may also lead to the coming into power of 
the military class. However, Veblen is not deterministic. He also evokes another scenario, 
which he favours. Institutional blocs related to the absentee owners can be solved by the setup 
of a new system: the society could evolve to a technocracy, dominated by the elite composed 
of economists and engineers. The society would then be peaceful, since the designation of an 
external enemy will be no longer necessary to maintain the society’s cohesion. His ideas are 
close to those of Saint Simon's in France. 
 
 The future of international peace thus depends, according to Veblen, on the conflicting 
relations within each society between the dynastic warlike tendencies and the modern peaceful 
tendencies. Even if he does not exclude the relapse into conflicts, Veblen affirmed that 
modernity will dominate in the majority of countries and therefore lead to international peace. 
The liberalization of industry and trade would result in the improvement of living conditions 
and accelerate the modernization of society. 
 
 Veblen also proposed the creation of a “League of Neutral Countries” to facilitate trade 
liberalization as well as to abolish preferential rates inside colonial empires, thus discouraging 
colonial conquests. Veblen’s theory has a specific place in the history of economic thought, 
since it relies on economics, sociology and history simultaneously. A connection may be 
established with Joseph Schumpeter's works, in particular Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1942). Schumpeter treated the pacifism of the capitalist bourgeoisie as opposed 
to the warlike spirit of feudalism; and he explained that capitalism’s progress has an 
institutional consequence: the destruction of protective classes that support the system, and in 
particular the military class. The bourgeoisie is basically “rationalist and anti-heroic” and its 
disinterest for political issues increases the risk of the coming into power of a charismatic 
military leader, who would win the population to his cause. But his forecast is rather that 
capitalism should evolve towards an increasingly bureaucratic state capitalism model, very 
close to socialism, because of growing interventionism that tends to suppress the 
entrepreneurial spirit. This progressive weakening of the capitalist spirit due to the rise of 
economic interventionism is also an idea present in Werner Sombart’s analyses (1913). 
 
2. Economists' criticisms of militarism 
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 Economists’ criticisms of militarism are based, since their origins, on arguments which 
remain relevant today. Thus, the liberal analysis presents the perpetuation of a high level of 
military expenditures as resulting from a misunderstanding about the general interest, or even 
from a capture of the state by particular interests. This idea has been developed beyond the 
liberal school, leading to criticism of political institutions governing capitalism. Since the 
1960s, the development of economic techniques has favored deeper studies of the defense 
sector. Most of them have then highlighted the negative economic impacts of military 
expenditures. The most important studies on these issues have been developed in the United 
States. 
 
Militarism as a consequence of the perverted state system 
 
 The liberal criticism of militarism rests on economic arguments, which have been 
developed as early as the 18th century. Wars are perceived as a waste of financial and human 
resources, as well as a loss of revenues. Thus, Smith (1776) treated soldiers like unproductive 
workers and J.B. Say treated them like destructive ones. Ricardo, Say and later Pigou 
highlighted the negative effects of debt-funded war, where debt induces a heavy burden on the 
national economy when the conflict is over. 
  
 As for the analysis of the causes of conflicts, the liberal school has largely developed the 
idea of a state subjected to the influence of vested interests linked with militarism. Thus, Smith 
denounced commercial protectionism, so often a source of war, such as military expeditions 
and colonialism. His criticism rests in particular on the idea that the state faces pressures from 
merchants and industrialists, leading it to support particular interests instead of the general 
interest. He then condemns colonialism because of the cost of conquests and of maintaining 
sufficient military forces to guarantee peace in empires. 
 
 Similar ideas were developed in other liberal economists’ works. For example, Pareto 
(1897) denounced the cost of wars carried out by governments, which finance them with a tax 
increase even though most taxpayers do not draw any benefit from such conflicts. According 
to him, the excess of military expenditures is explained by the megalomania of the dominant 
classes and the government's exploitation of external threat to ensure the cohesion of the 
society and divert popular attention away from the embezzlements of leaders. There is thus a 
mutual action between the military, gaining specific privileges, and the government, enabling 
it to stay in power. 
 
 Later an alternative critique was developed through the concept of the military-industrial 
complex. In 1961 President Eisenhower first used this concept to denounce the growing 
influence of services and the defense industry in the United States and the risk that it weakens 
democracy. This concept focuses on the strong autonomy of the military sector, helping a 
narrow coalition of the interests between all defense stakeholders seeking to increase military 
expenditures. 
  
 This idea was largely developed by Galbraith (1973, 1992). Galbraith noted that arms 
industries and the Department of Defense pursue common goals of growth and technical 
innovation in a “bureaucratic symbiosis,” depriving citizens of any initiative. Underlining the 
excessive and unfounded character of the USSR threat, Galbraith explained why its use by the 
members of the military establishment helped keep a high level of military expenditures in the 
United States and other Western industrialized countries. The fact that the end of the Cold War 
was not followed by significant large-scale and permanent disarmament shows the autonomy 
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of the military sector. Arms exports and military technologies continue to be largely financed 
by governments. The economists’ critique of militarism is thus directly related to the flaws in 
political institutions. The link between the military and the political sphere is more than ever 
topical, with today's polemics concerning American foreign policy. One example is Stiglitz's 
papers and book that criticize the high cost of the Iraq war for American taxpayers (Stiglitz 
and Bilmes, 2008). 
 
Empirical analysis of the negative impacts of military expenditures on growth 
 
 Defense economics has become an autonomous field of study thanks to the introduction 
of modeling, statistics and econometrics, notably used for the analysis of the economic 
consequences of military expenditures. Until the 1960s, economists limited their analysis to the 
assertion of their unproductiveness. They did not consider that defense budget could exert an 
autonomous economic role and influence economic policy. Theoretical convictions and 
deductive analysis served as diagnosis, in the absence of empirical studies. A pioneering 
contribution establishing the economics of defense was published by Hitch and McKean 
(1960).  This book presented all military problems as economic problems in the efficient 
allocation and use of scarce resources.  There was no economic analysis of peace.3  
 
 Since the 1970s, when economic crisis raised doubts about the sustainability of growth 
in Western economies, many economic studies have dealt with the economic consequences of 
high defense budgets in industrialized countries, while the international arms race was 
accelerating technological competition. Defense economics then realized great development, 
and liberal pacifists found new justifications for the development of arguments in favor of 
disarmament. Economic studies on the military sector multiplied, in particular within the 
United Nations Organization and more precisely UNIDIR (1984, 1992). Such research 
demonstrated that public funds would be better employed in health and education sectors than 
in defense. The arms race was seen as constituting a waste of resources and thus a barrier to 
economic growth. These analyses used the concepts and instruments of the Neoclassical or 
Keynesian theories. Their results were heterogeneous and generated numerous controversies, 
in particular starting from Emile Benoit's seminal study (1978) that showed a positive relation 
between militarization and economic development in less developed countries. The validity of 
macroeconomic models used by all these studies has often been questioned, because of 
difficulties concerning the selection of data on international comparisons, the choice of 
temporal horizon, the variables and the econometric methods used. 
 
Economists wishing to highlight the negative impact of defense expenditures largely used neo-
Keynesian macroeconomic models. Among the first major studies, was Leontief and Duchin 
(1983)'s, studying several scenarios of increase or reduction in consumer goods per capita 
according to the levels of military expenditures in various countries. This large macroeconomic 
study showed inter alia that military expenditures do not exert a significant effect in favour of 
economic growth. Another study by Deger and Sen (1983) tested a model of three simultaneous 
equations, representing the interactions between growth, investment and defense for fifty 
developing countries. Their results showed that the growth of the military sector led to a 
decrease in the economic growth rate. Biswas and Ram (1986) reached a similar conclusion, 
                                                 
3 The development of defense economics was recognised in the creation of a new specialist research journal 
entitled Defence Economics, launched in 1990.  In 1995, this journal was re-named Defence and Peace 
Economics to reflect the post-Cold War security changes and the increasing focus on disarmament, conversion 
and peace issues.   For a review of defense economics, see Hartley (2007) ; and a survey of peace economics, see 
Anderton and Carter (2007). 
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as well as Faini et al. (1984) and Georgiou and Smith (1983). A review of studies in the field 
concluded “…that the net impact of defense on growth is negative, but small” (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1995, p220).   
 
 Economists have also studied the crowding-out effect of military expenditures on other 
public expenditures to counter the arguments of military Keynesianism. Samuelson (1984) thus 
explained that civil public expenditures are more favorable to economic growth than military 
ones, which exert a neutral multiplier effect. Russett (1970) showed that there is a substitution 
effect between military and social expenditures in the United States.  Berthélemy, Herrera and 
Sen (1995) showed a negative crowding-out effect between defense and education expenditures 
with a large negative effect on economic growth.4 
 The debate on the economic consequences of military expenditures remains important 
in the post-Cold war period. The success of the American economy in the 1990s seemed to 
reinforce the idea of positive technological spin-offs from the military sector; but other analyses 
have showed the negative effect of rising American defense budgets in terms of debt, the 
external deficit and inflation. 
 
3. Economists’ proposals in favor of international peace 
 
 Calls for reductions in military expenditures are part of economic thought since the 
origins of liberalism. They are often associated with the idea of an expected end of militarism 
thanks to the rise of the industrial spirit. During the 19th century, many economists have made 
more or less realistic proposals in favor of international institutions for a peaceful settlement of 
disputes, opening the way to  world disarmament. These ideas are particularly present in the 
works of the French “utopian socialists” as well as in the liberal school. After the Second World 
War, economists' pacifism has been expressing through more scientific research, in particular 
with economic studies undertaken by UNIDIR. 
 
Before the First World War: from Utopia to practice 
 
 In France during the 19th century, many utopian projects defined universal peace as a 
crucial objective. One recurring ideas was that nations should develop institutions for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. The idea of a European federation which would dominate the 
world and impose its model was a main field of research. Thus, Saint-Simon (1814) explained 
that progressives domination of industrialists would be bound to favor disarmament and 
international peace, under European domination. He proposed the control of all European 
nations in a European Parliament, with the arbitration of conflicts between countries as its key 
function. War within such a confederation would be avoided thanks to the full activity of its 
populations. Saint-Simon imagined a Franco-British alliance with a common Parliament, a 
common currency, free trade – all conditions which would guarantee a state of peace favorable 
to economic development. 
 
 The European civilization was presented by Utopians as superior to all other 
civilizations and destined to expand worldwide, for the sake of humankind. Fourier (1846) also 
developed a project calling for the unification of mankind, as a result of the conquest of the 
world by an enlightened (French) despot. Perpetual peace should then appear and France would 
be able spread her superior laws first in Europe and then on the entire planet. Fourier’s 
economic analyses are weak, but his intellectual influence was important. In particular, he 
                                                 
4  A more specific test of crowding-out was undertaken for UK defence R&D where no evidence was found of a 
simple linear long-run relationship between defence and civil R&D spending: Buck, et al (1993). 
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directly inspires Considérant and Pecqueur. In his writings, Pecqueur (1842a, 1842b) 
recommended the installation of international courts for the settlement of interstate disputes. 
Thanks to the application of controlled liberalism, social progress should lead to the creation 
of a European federation. A Common Market should then be set up, free from all prohibitions 
and commercial restrictions. A federal Congress would take charge of foreign policy, notably 
military alliances and colonialism. 
 
 Numerous economists have proposed the creation of international organizations to 
settle conflicts. One can mention Blanc (1839), who imagined the creation of a High 
Confederate Court to regulate conflicts between member states. Cabet (1848), a proponent of 
Communism, also recommended a Confederation of the people, with general disarmament, 
both military and commercial. As regards the liberal school, de Molinari (1898) analyzed the 
negative impact of the military spending on industrial societies and the necessity of an 
international institution for the settlement of conflicts. 
  
 These projects were partly reinforced with the creation of the League of Nations in 
1920. Some economists, in particular Keynes, placed great hope in the peaceful settlement of 
disputes thanks to international economic sanctions, hopes of which were ultimately thwarted. 
Economists’ calls for disarmament have been particularly frequent before the First World War, 
especially within the liberal school. The free trade issue was then closely associated with 
international peace. Without much concern about methodology and scientific rigour, these 
economists transformed economics into an apologia (i.e. into a non-scientific defense of their 
liberal “religion”). With his faith in the existence of a divine law regulating a “universal 
harmony,” Bastiat (1862) did not doubt that the worldwide spread of free trade would work in 
favor of a universal and permanent peace. Like J.B. Say, he recommended the end of the 
colonial system, the replacement of offensive foreign policies by a defensive strategy with the 
reduction of military budgets and a diminished use of militia, that would decrease tax rates and 
allow increases in consumption. He even proposed a total and immediate disarmament of 
France: this would make her able to lead a true revolution, which would spread the idea of 
democracy in the world. 
 
 More pragmatic, Passy (1904) proposed a European customs union (underlining the 
trend to association as one of the laws of history), while being opposed to defensive tariffs 
against American and Japanese trade. According to him, Europe must undertake an important 
disarmament, which would both release resources for productive activities and pacify the 
relations between European countries. Passy denounced not only the cost of war, but also that 
of armed peace. He also denied the idea that civil industry needs the impulse of technologies 
developed in the military sector. Keynes accused these liberal pacifist economists, and in 
particular Angell (1913), of having disserved their country by denying the reality of threats to 
national security and maintaining their calls to peace until the eve of the First World War. 
 
The Peace Movement before the First World War 
 
 The pacifist movement was particularly active during the 19th century, with the creation 
of many peace societies, in particular in Great Britain and United States. This movement for 
non-violence was influenced by the Protestant religion5. The American Peace Society was 
                                                 
5 Prior to the Protestation Reformation, the Catholic Church supported the views of St Thomas` Aquinas who 
justified the use of arms to protect innocent life from attack (the just war theory).  The Protestant Reformation 
gave rise to to a variety of new Christian sects, including the historic peace churches.  Prominent amongst these 
were the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers).   
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created in 1828, on the initiative of William Ladd, who defended the principle of a "Congress 
and High Court of Nations." Another pioneer institution of the pacifist movement, the London 
Peace Society (first called The Society for the Promotion of Universal and Permanent Peace), 
was founded in 1816. This society has worked actively in favor of pacifist ideals, in particular 
at the time Henry Richard, who defended international arbitration was its secretary. This idea 
of international arbitration to guarantee international peace had another defender in the person 
of Richard Cobden, who also proposed a mutual arms reduction in Europe.  
 
 The peace movement also developed in France and in Switzerland. The « Ligue 
internationale et permanente de la paix » (International and permanent league of peace)  was 
created in 1867 in Paris by Passy, and he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1901 along with 
Henry Dunant. This league was a reaction to the threat of another Franco-Prussian war. Passy’s 
project was to preserve peace through international arbitration. It competed with the «Ligue 
Internationale de la paix et de la liberté » (International league of peace and freedom) founded 
by Charles Lemonnier. This league pursued much more radical goals, with the denunciation of 
the militarism in the non-republican systems and a call for the formation of a United States of 
Europe. It held a Congress in Geneva in 1867. 
 
 Five International peace congresses were held in Europe from 1843 to 1851. The first 
one is historically the first international congress following from a private initiative. 
Some concrete achievements did emerge from them. In 1889 Passy and Randal Cremer brought 
together 96 members of Parliaments from nine countries to form the Parliamentary Union, 
intended for the peaceful settlement off conflicts between nations. Later, the international 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 asserted the principle of Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, with the creation in 1899 of the International Court of Arbitration, the 
predecessor of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  The League of Nations created in 1919 
gave birth in 1922 to the Permanent Court of International Justice, predecessor to the 
International Court of Justice in the Hague. The League of Nations aimed at promoting 
disarmament and preventing war through negotiation and international sanctions. Its failure to 
prevent aggression by the Axis powers during the 1930s substantially weakened the pacifist 
movement.  
 
Economists for Peace since the End of the Second World War 
 
 During the Cold War, the peace movement has spread into many fields, including 
science, medicine, and other fields. In economics, the debate has focused on the opportunity 
cost of military expenditures. The Soviet-U.S. arms race was criticized by many famous 
economists, including Arrow, Eisner, Galbraith, Klein, Solow, and Tobin who formed ECAAR 
(Economists Against Arms Race), now called Economists for Peace and Security (EPS). The 
economic analyses of the arms race started with the model of Richardson (1960). He published 
the first outlines of his model in 1939, hoping it could help governments to become aware of 
the dangerous character of an unstable arms race. His model was made up of three equations 
representing respectively political, strategic and economic factors. It  described the armament 
processes in two rival countries in a process of action-reaction, where the economic variables 
played a stabilizing effect. Several improvements were made thereafter to this model, as in 
Brito and Intriligator (1974). 
 
 Other economic studies have criticized the waste of resources on arms instead of on 
poverty reduction. Some have underlined the potential economic benefit of world 
disarmament, using large-scale international macroeconomic models. An example was the 
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World Model of Leontief and Duchin for the analysis of the impact of disarmament of the 
industrialized countries, with transfer of the saved sums towards developing countries. With 
the end of the Cold War, however, disarmament proved to be a complex process, and a 
UNIDIR study of the economics of disarmament suggested replacing the concept of “peace 
dividend” by one of “disarmament as an investment process” involving short-run costs and 
long-run benefits (UNIDIR, 1993).  Disarmament leads to costs in the form of unemployment 
or under-employment of labour, capital and other resources arising from the re-allocation of 
resources from military to civilian production.  Such re-allocation takes time and can be costly 
(we do not live in a world of magic wand economics where resources can be re-allocated 
instantly and costlessly).  As a result, the economic dividends of disarmament and peace are 
likely to be small in the short-run.  However, in the long-run, disarmament leads to significant 
and worthwhile benefits through peace itself and through the greater output of civil goods and 
services as resources are re-allocated from the military-industrial complex to the civilian 
sector.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this article, we try to emphasize that peace could and should become a research issue 
per se for economists. It is true that, as shown here, many leading economists emphasized that 
peace can result from market mechanisms and that it provides the best conditions for the 
efficient allocation of productive resources. They conclude that economic agents ought to avoid 
conflicts if they are rational.  
 
 Nevertheless, denouncing war and its economic consequences is not enough. In most 
economic research, peace remains a result or a pre-condition for economic efficiency. It does 
not attain the status of a full economic issue. This situation cannot be considered as satisfactory 
for two main reasons. First, history demonstrates that economic mechanisms, in particular 
having a market economy is a necessary condition for peace, but it is not sufficient. The doux 
commerce helps reduce political and social tensions between nations by improving mutual 
understanding and economic interdependence. As Montesquieu emphasized two centuries ago, 
"commerce softens and polishes the manners of men." However, conflicts can have economic 
and non-economic grounds that can overcome the economic rationale in favor of peace. The 
"reciprocal utility" promoted by Montesquieu through trade is sometimes not enough to prevent 
conflicts. This topic suggests a major area for economic research, in the same direction as the 
economics of terrorism for instance. We do not really understand the economic causes of 
conflicts, except for the most obvious, such as conflicts over natural resources. By improving 
our understanding of such causes, it would be possible to propose policies that are real 
alternatives to armament and military spending. Second, peace cannot be considered only as a 
result or an exogenous factor. It is very unsatisfactory to define it as the absence of conflicts or 
war: this is how defense policy can be defined, not peace. This latter requires an active policy, 
for it is far from certain that peace will always emerge from given economic conditions. If we 
truly want peace, then we cannot escape from investing in it! 
 
As an example, consider the economics of conflict which is at the opposite end of the spectrum 
from peace.  The economic analysis of conflict is in sharp contrast to neo-classical economics.  
Capitalist economies are characterized by markets allowing voluntary trade and exchange based 
on the price mechanism as an allocative device with improved economic welfare reflected in a 
greater output of goods and services.  In contrast, conflict uses military force to re-allocate 
resources, to destroy factors of production (e.g. deaths and injuries to military and civilian 
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personnel) and to destroy markets leading to chaos and disequilibrium (compared with market 
equilibria).    
 
 There are three areas for further research suggested here: preventing war; stopping 
conflicts; and curing the roots of conflict. First, wars can be prevented. This is perhaps the field 
in which economists have invested most heavily. Nevertheless the focus has been mainly on 
military expenditures, that is, the preparation for and prevention of war. One should consider 
peace as a global public good, following the research launched by Inge Kaul and the UNDP in 
the early 2000s (Kaul et al., 2003). Managing such a global public good requires credible 
international institutions, in particular, those that are able to implement peace against potential 
belligerents. This goes beyond burden sharing and fiscal federalism, and can make use of both 
game theory and contract theory. It also recognizes that there gaps in international institutions 
for achieving beneficial international collective action (Sandler and Hartley, 2001). Second, 
when conflicts start, restoring peace requires military means as well as economic ones. 
Unfortunately it seems not possible to deny the utility of force (Smith, 2006); but it is crucial 
to focus spending on the adequate means to maintain and preserve peace. Peace-keeping and 
peace-restoring remain understudied in economics (Solomon, 2007; Solomon and Berkok, 
2006). However, one cannot expect to attain a situation of peace without investing in the means 
to sustain it. Economists can demonstrate here the flaws of current approaches, especially the 
insufficient funding of UN operations and gaps in international institutions for enforcing peace. 
Third, peace can never be sustainable if the roots of conflicts (including terrorism) are not 
eradicated. In fact, this is perhaps the biggest mistake made by defense-minded decision-
makers. Ending a conflict and destroying the means of violence are not sufficient to prevent a 
resumption of the conflict if the reasons why a given war has started remain. This leads to a 
broader analysis between war and its economic roots. It is crucial to suppress the economic 
imbalances or inequities to have a sustainable peace. Here, economic analysis can help 
decision-makers re-allocate public spending to focus on the most relevant issues, not on those 
which seem to have the most immediate results. 
 
 Peace must become a core field of economic research attracting far more academic 
economists. The field needs to offer incentives and rewards through research funding, 
conference and publication opportunities and promotion prospects. Many questions remain 
unsolved, mainly because they have not yet been identified because of a lack of their 
investigation. Military spending has reached its highest levels ever in the current century, and 
their consequences have caught most of the attention. Issues include the continued threats to 
peace and to the future of civilization from weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological 
and chemical), their proliferation and use by ‘rogue states’ and terrorist groups. Whether  
military spending increases or decreases, one should wish that peace would receive the attention 
it deserves from economists in forthcoming years. This is required if humanity is to avoid 
continued spending so much for war and so little for peace. 
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